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1 Introduction 
The variety of interpretations exhibited by sentences with reciprocals is a long­
standing challenge for semantic and pragmatic theories .  This puzzle is related to 
some hard questions about the interpretation of plural predicates in general. In this 
paper we study the implications of relations between reciprocity and plurality for 
the account of reciprocals in Dalrymple et al. ( 1994) . It will be proposed that Dal­
rymple et al. 's Strongest Meaning Hypothesis about the interpretation of reciprocals 
has a more general status in the semantics of plurality. The extended principle 
proposed determines the interpretation of a plural predicate according to lexical 
semantic properties of the corresponding singular predicate. The reformulation of 
Dalrymple et al. 's hypothesis will be shown to derive correct predictions about the 
interpretation of plural predicate conjunction and transitive plural predicates. The 
extension of the strongest meaning hypothesis also eliminates the ambiguity of re­
ciprocals in Dalrymple et al. 's proposal and employs the standard Boolean analysis 
of conjunction. The relevant problems associated with the interpretation of plurals 
are not conceived as formal semantic phenomena proper. Rather, the strongest 
meaning hypothesis is formulated as a principle that non-standardly changes formal 
meaning using lexical semantic knowledge on predicates. 
2 Dalrymple et al. 's proposal 
One case that exemplifies the motivation for the strongest meaning hypothesis is the 
contrast between sentences ( I a) and (2a) . Assume that the girls in both cases are 
Mary, Sue and Jane. ( 1  a) and ( 1b) are contradictory. However, (2a) and (2b) are not: 
they are both true in case Jane is standing on Sue, who is in tum standing on Mary. 
Tentatively, we conclude that ( 1  a) is equivalent to ( 1c) (but see some qualifications 
below) while (2a) is not equivalent to (2c) . 
( I )  a. The girls know each other 
b . . . .  # but Mary doesn't  know Sue 
c. Every girl knows every other girl 
(2) a. The girls are standing on each other 
b . . . .  but Mary is not standing on Sue 
c. # Every girl is standing on every other girl 
Dalrymple et al. 's proposal is an account of such contrasts. First, it is 
assumed that reciprocals are ambiguous. In ( I a) the meaning of the reciprocal is 
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"strong reciprocity" as paraphrased by ( I c) .  In (2a) the meaning of the reciprocal 
is weaker (let us ignore the details for a while), which allows the sentence to be 
true also in situations falsifying the strong reciprocity reading (2c) . Dalrymple et 
at. systematically study some possible meanings of reciprocals in various contexts. 
The second part of their proposal is a principle that determines which reading of 
the reciprocal is realized in a given sentence. This principle, called the Strongest 
Meaning Hypothesis, is quoted below. 
(3) The Strongest Meaning Hypothesis (SMH): "A reciprocal sentence is inter­
preted as expressing the logically strongest candidate truth conditions which 
are not contradicted by known properties of the relation expressed by the 
reciprocal scope when restricted to the group argument." 
Let us exemplify the operation of the SMH in ( I a) and (2a) .  The strongest meaning 
possible for a reciprocal is strong reciprocity. ( I c) ,  the reading this meaning gener­
ates for ( I a), is compatible with our world (lexical) knowledge about the predicate 
to know. According to this knowledge ( I c) is contingent - it can be true for any 
number of girls. The SMH claims that the strongest reading possible is also the 
attested one and therefore in ( I a) each other means strong reciprocity. In (2a), how­
ever, strong reciprocity would result in the pragmatically implausible paraphrase 
(2c), which is by necessity false given our knowledge of the predicate to stand on. 
Consequently, the SMH expects the meaning of (2a) to be weaker, as it is the case. 
Dalrymple et al.'s proposal provides, for the first time, an explicit and 
falsifiable principle that describes the way various interpretations of reciprocals can 
be obtained. However, there are two reservations of a general nature that I would 
like to consider: (i) The SMH is introduced as a construction-specific rule for 
reciprocals. One might expect such a radical connection between lexical knowledge 
and formal meaning to have a manifestation also in other linguistic contexts. Is 
it indeed the case? (ii) Can the SMH mechanism be formulated without the 
unattractive massive ambiguity of reciprocals Dalrymple et at. postulate? 
In what follows I will propose affirmative answers to both questions. In fact, 
it will be shown that they can be viewed as two sides of the same coin. 
3 Plural predicate conjunction 
Cases like (2a) challenge the strong reciprocity treatment of each other. Similarly, a 
challenge for the traditional Boolean treatment of and can be observed in sentences 
like (Sa). For example, in the situation described by figure 1 below (Sa) is true, 
although a "strong" interpretation as in (Sb), obtained using universal quantification 
and Boolean conjunction, is absurd. (Sa) can be roughly paraphrased by: some 
birds are above the cloud, the others are below it. By contrast, if we consider a 
minimally different sentence like (4a) the "weak reading" disappears: (4a) is false 
in the situation of figure 1 .  Thus, (4a) reflects approximately the same "strong" 
statement as (4b). whereas (Sa) clearly makes a weaker claim than (Sb). 
(4) a. The birds are flying above the house and below the cloud. 
b. Every bird is flying above the house and below the cloud. 
WHAT DOES THE STRONGEST MEANING HYPOTHESIS MEAN? 
(5) a. The birds are flying above the cloud and below the cloud. 
b. # Every bird is flying above the cloud and below the cloud. 
Figure 1 :  a cloud and a house with birds 
Note the parallelism between the contrast (4)-(5) and the contrast ( 1 )- (2) .  
In both pairs the "strong" reading appears when the situations that verify it are 
possible according to common world knowledge. This is the case in ( 1 a) and (4a) .  
However, when a "strong" interpretation is absurd, as in (2a) and (5a), it is not the 
actual reading of the sentence. Some principle prefers a contingent weak reading 
to a stronger but absurd one. In the next section I will propose that in ( 1 )-(2) and in 
(4)-(5) this principle is the same: the strongest meaning hypothesis. 
Contrasts similar to (4)-(5) also exist between (6) and (7) and between ( 8 )  
and (9) below. Sentence (6) i s  false in the situation depicted in figure 2 below. This 
is expected according to a strong reading like every duck is swimming and quacking . 
In (7), by contrast, such an assertion would contradict our knowledge that ducks 
cannot both swim and fly at the same time. According to the intuition of the SMH 
this reading should therefore be  weakened, as i t  i s  the case: (7) truthfully describes 
figure 2. Consider now (8) and (9) in a situation with four books . Sentence ( 8 )  
requires every book to be both old and interesting. In (9), by contrast, two old books 
and two new ones would suffice to make the sentence true. 
(6) The ducks are swimming and quacking. 
(7) The ducks are swimming and flying. 
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Figure 2: ducks 
(8) The books are old and interesting. 
(9) The books are old and new. 
4 Extending the SMH 
The examples discussed above support the intuition behind the SMH also in cases of 
plural predication that do not involve reciprocity: lexical knowledge about predicates 
can affect the formal meaning of the sentence also with plural predicate conjunction. 
Let us hypothesize that this effect is a general property of plural predication. We 
thus modify Dalrymple et at. 's hypothesis as follows: 
( 1 0) The (Extended) Strongest Meaning Hypothesis (henceforth SMH): A plural 
predicate whose meaning is derived from one or more singular predicates is 
interpreted using the logically strongest truth conditions that are generated 
from one basic meaning and that are not contradicted by known properties of 
the singular predicate(s). 
This revised formulation of the SMH is obviously too vague. It is not clear what is 
the "basic meaning" that is subject to weakening and how precisely this process is 
supposed to work. Let us consider in more detail the proposed implementation of 
the SMH, deferring some additional technicalities to section 8.  
In order to generate the basic meaning of complex plural predicates we adopt 
three traditional assumptions about their interpretation: 
(i) The meaning of a plural predicate is derived from the meaning of the corre­
sponding singular predicate using universal quantification over members of 
the group argument. For example : 
P<t --+ p(< t ) t  = Ao4et .Vx [o4 (x)  --+ P(.r) ] 
(ii) The meaning of a reciprocated plural predicate is derived from the meaning 
of the corresponding singular n-ary predicate using strong reciprocity (SR). 
For example: 
Rd.t )  2!i P(e t ) t  = Ao4<t .Vx E A Vy E o4 [x f:- y --+ R(x , y) ] 
(iii) Conjunction is Boolean. 
WHAT DOES THE STRONGEST MEANING HYPOTHESIS MEAN? 
It should be emphasized that the universal quantification schemes assumed in (i) and 
(ii) above are only approximations to the actual process in plural predication, which 
is in fact more vague. A sentence like the ducks are quacking is more vague and 
probably weaker than the sentence every duck is quacking. Similarly, the sentence 
the men are hitting each other is not equivalent to the sentence every man is hitting 
every other man. For the sake of the present discussion, however, the universal 
approximation is sufficient. As in Dalrymple et al. ( 1994), we will consider only 
cases with small groups, where such vagueness effects are less prominent. 
Assumptions (i)-(iii) are responsible for the derivation of basic meanings of 
sentences with plural predicates. Weakening effects will be treated using the SMH 
and will not be conceived as a formal semantic process, but rather as an interaction 
between formal and lexical semantics. To see how this idea works consider first the 
basic meaning generated for ( I a) and (2a) using strong reciprocity: 
( 1 ' ) Vx E girls' Vy E girls' [x ::j:. y -+ know' (x, y)] 
(2' ) Vx E girls' Vy E girls' [x ::j:. y -+ stand_on' (x, y)] 
The operation of the SMH can be intuitively described as follows. Propositions (1 ') 
and (2') ,  instead of being treated as the ultimate readings of ( I a) and (2a) (which 
in the second case would be wrong), are treated as schemes for weakening using 
the SMH. In order to describe this procedure it is convenient to look at a concrete 
model as in figure 3(a) below. In this graph a directed arc gl -+ g2 corresponds 
to a (knowing/standing on) relation between girl gl and girl g2 ' The situation in 
(a) satisfies both ( 1  ') and (2' ) .  The crucial point is that while this situation is 
possible given lexical properties of the predicate to know, it is an impossible state 
of things with the predicate to stand on. The SMH requires only a graph with 
a maximal number of arcs that does not contradict the lexical properties of the 
predicate. Therefore, the SMH predicts that the situation in (a) verifies ( l a) and 
any graph with a smaller number of arcs does not. However, for (2a) the graph in 
(a) contradicts lexical properties of the predicate to stand on (e.g. anti-symmetry). 
Thus, also graphs with a smaller number of arcs should do to verify (2a) . For 
example, the graph in figure 3(b) does not contradict lexical properties of to stand 
on but any additional arc in it would. Thus, according to the SMH this situation 
verifies (2a), which is indeed the case. These graphical intuitions will be given a 
formal correlate in section 8.  
The same intuitions apply in cases of conjunction as (6)  and (7) .  Given 
the formal assumptions above we generate the following basic meanings for these 
sentences respectively: 
Vx E ducks' [swim' (x) /\ quack' (x)] 
Vx E ducks' [swim' (x) /\ fly' (x) ]  
To make the analogy with ( 1  ' ) and (2' )  more transparent, note that these formulae 
are equivalent to (6' ) and (7' )  below respectively: 
(6' ) Vx E ducks' VP E {swim' ,  quack'} [P(x)] 
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(a) (b) 
:� :� 
Jme  Jme 
Mary >. Mary 
Sue • Sue 
Jme • Jme 
Figure 3: situations verifying ( 1 a) md (2a) 
(7' )  'Vx E ducks' 'VP E {swim' , fly'} [P(x) ]  
Thus, in both ( 1 ' )-(2 ' )  md (6' )-(7 ' )  the propositions involve two universal qumti­
fiers, in the latter case one of them qumtifies over predicates. Consider now the 
situations in figure 4 below. The graph in (a), which attributes every duck both 
the swimming md quacking properties, is possible given lexical knowledge about 
these predicates.  This situation, therefore, is predicted by the SMH to satisfy (6), 
whereas a graph with smaller number of arcs does not. In (7), by contrast, the 
complete graph would contradict world knowledge about the predicates to swim md 
to fly. The graph in (b) has a maximal number of arcs that does not contradict these 
properties. Consequently, the SMH predicts that also such a situation verifies (7). 
This is correct. 
(a) (b) 
duck 1 duck 1 
duck 2 swim duck 2 swim 
duck 3 quack duck 3 fly 
duck 4 duck 4 
Figure 4: situations verifying (6) md (7) 
This account of problematic sentences like (7) has one rather non-stmdard 
property. Compare the interpretation of (7) with the following sentential conjunc­
tion: 
( 1 1 )  # The ducks are swimming md the ducks are flying. 
a. 'Vx E ducks' [swim' (x)] A. 'Vx E ducks' [fly' (x)] 
( 1 1 ), unlike (7), has a strmge flavour: it implies that ducks cm swim md fly at 
the same time. In the treatment proposed here this is so not because of a formal 
WHAT DOES THE STRONGEST MEANING HYPOTHESIS MEAN? 
semantic mechanism: the basic meanings of (7) and ( 1 1 )  are just the same -
(7 ' )  (=( 1 1 a)) .  However, the difference between (7) and ( 1 1 )  is in the way the 
SMH applies. The SMH is a principle of plural predication. Therefore, in ( 1 1 )  
it applies in each sentential conjunct separately. For these sentential conjuncts 
the SMH does not have any effect because their meanings do not independently 
violate any world knowledge of the predicates .  Therefore the basic meaning ( 1 1 a) 
of ( 1 1 )  is also the attested meaning of the sentence. In (7), by contrast, predicate 
conjunction compositionally applies before predication and therefore also before 
the SMH applies. Thus, in (7) it is the basic meaning of the whole sentence that 
is weakened by the SMH. As we saw, this meaning contradicts lexical properties 
of the predicates and therefore the SMH has an influence on the attested meaning 
of the (7). To conclude, the difference between (7) and ( 1 1 )  is not treated at the 
formal semantic level, but rather as an interference of a semi-pragmatic principle, 
the SMH, in the predication process. 
The intuitive discussion above suggests that the SMH can operate in the same 
way in cases of reciprocity and in cases of plural predicate conjunction, predicting 
the semantic similarities observed between the two phenomena. Before moving on 
to further factual matters, let us briefly discuss a general point where this extension 
of the SMH is relevant. 
5 Weakening or strengthening? 
The SMH concept involves semantic weakening of a "default" strong basic meaning. 
An opposite view, advocated in Langendoen ( 1 978), among many others, is to start 
with a weak meaning and appeal to pragmatic strengthening in cases like ( I  a ) .  
Dalrymple et al .  argue that the latter strategy is implausible: cases like ( l a) are 
unlikely to be subject to strengthening via a cancelable pragmatic mechanism l i ke 
conversational implicature. This is because the strong reciprocity entailment in ( I a )  
i s  not cancelable, as the infelicity o f  the continuation i n  ( 1  b )  shows. But Mats 
Rooth (p.c . )  raises the following question: why cannot strengthening be obtained 
by a symmetric principle to the SMH? Thus, instead of the weakening strategy of 
the SMH start with a weak reading and strengthen it using an opposite principle 
(probably independent of conversational maxims) .  
The present conception shows a general motivation coming from previous 
work on conjunction and reciprocals to prefer the SMH to such a strengthening 
strategy. We saw how the SMH allows us to analyze cases like (Sa), ( 7 )  and 
(9) using standard Boolean conjunction . A strengthening analysis of such ca\es 
would require to start from a weaker denotation for conjunction, obtained us ing 
some definition of "non-Boolean" and. However, while Boolean conjunction was 
fruitfully given elegant cross-categorial definitions (e.g. in Keenan & Faltz ( 1 98 5 ) .  
Partee & Rooth ( 1 983)) , attempts to generalize non-Boolean definitions of alld 
proved highly problematic (see Winter ( 1 994) on this point) .  This is a central 
motivation to pursue the standard Boolean analysis of conjunction also for the treat­
ment of plural predicate conjunction. Consequently, a weakening strategy is to be 
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preferred. 
Similar considerations also hold with respect to reciprocals as soon as one 
adopts the decompositional analysis of each other in Heim, Lasnik & May ( 1 99 1 ) ,  
where it is proposed to treat the English reciprocal compositionally using the univer­
sal expression each and the anaphor other. If this is correct, weakening is preferable 
also with reciprocals, since their lexical decomposition most easily derives an in­
terpretation using strong reciprocity - universal quantification is obtained by the 
lexical meaning of each. 
6 Applicability of the 5MB and transitive constructions 
Given that the SMH is proposed as a general plurality principle, it is natural to ask: 
does the SMH apply in all cases of plural predication? As indicated in ( 10) the 
answer is negative: the SMH determines only how a predicate that lexically ranges 
over singular individuals (a "distributive" predicate) can directly apply to plural 
individuals. Consequently, there are two general cases of plural predication where 
the SMH does not apply: 
1 .  Predicates that lexically apply to plural individuals ("collective" predicates). 
For example, predicates like to meet or to lift allow (and in the first case 
even necessitate) a collective interpretation to the subject argument. Thus, 
the SMH says nothing about the interpretation of sentences like the boys met 
or the boys lifted the piano. 
2. Cases of predication where some mechanism of distributivity intermediates 
between the predicate and the plural argument. For example, in order to 
analyze sentences like ( 12) correctly, we must assume that the semantics 
involves universal quantification as in ( 1 2a) . 
( 1 2) Mary and Sue are wearing a dress. 
a. Vy E { m' , s' } 3x [dress' (x) 1\ wear' (y, x) ]  
Without getting into the controversy surrounding the question how distribu­
tivity as in ( 1 2a) is derived, it is clear that if some grammatical operation 
derives this interpretation independently of the SMH, then the SMH does not 
apply in such cases because the correct distributive interpretation involves a 
universal quantifier mediating between the predicate to wear and the plural 
argument. Thus, the predicate actually applies to the singular individuals that 
are being quantified over. 
These two general points are important when considering the following 
question : can the SMH be observed in cases of transitive plural predication that 
do not involve reciprocity or conjunction? To answer this question effectively, we 
should first make sure that effects of "collectivity" and "distributivity" as mentioned 
above do not appear. It is hard to observe any SMH effect in transitive constructions 
like ( 1 3) because the collective interpretation might interfere. 
WHAT DOES THE STRONGEST MEANING HYPOTHESIS MEAN? 
( 1 3) Mary and Sue lifted the pianos. 
Also in sentences like ( 14) it might be hard to observe the SMH in action because 
of a distributivity effect sometimes referred to as "partitions": ( 14) can be true in 
case a policeman A arrested a thief A, a policeman B arrested a thief B, and these 
policemen and thieves are the ones being referred to by the definite NP's. 
( 14) The policemen arrested the thieves .  
Such partition effects were discussed in Scha ( 198 1 )  and Schwarzschild ( 199 1 )  
(among others) .  Schwarzschild proposed to extend some common assumptions 
about the mechanism of distributivity. Thus, if this idea is correct also ( 14) is not a 
convenient test for the SMH. 
In order to avoid collective interpretations as in ( 1 3),  let us concentrate on 
predicates like to watch, to sit and to give birth, which often resist "togetherness". 
One way to avoid . also partition effects is simply to make the partition reading 
false: to consider a situation in which no "partition" of the arguments satisfies the 
predicate. For example, consider sentence ( 1 5) in situation (a) of figure 5. There is 
no way to divide the cats and dogs in the picture into subsets such that in each subset 
every cat is watching every dog. In such a "no partition" situation the sentence is 
false: no cat in figure 5(a) is watching dog 3. By contrast, consider sentence ( 1 6) .  
In figure 5(b), the same kind of situation as (a), sentence ( 1 6) is true although no cat 
is sitting in basket 3. 1 
( 1 5) The cats are watching the dogs. 
( 1 6) The cats are sitting in the baskets. 
(a) 
cat I cat 2 
I I  • 
dog I dog 2 dog 3 
(b) 
cat I cat 2 
I I  
basket 1 basket 2 
Figure 5 :  cats , dogs and baskets 
• 
basket 3 
Given the SMH in its extended formulation this contrast is expected. A cat 
can watch more than one dog at the same time and therefore situation (a) in figure 5 
does not contain a maximal number of watching relations given the lexical properties 
of the predicate. In (b) however, any additional "sitting in" relation between a cat 
and a basket would require one cat to sit in two baskets at the same time. Therefore, 
according to the SMH this situation is expected to verify ( 1 6) .  
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Another way to check the SMH is to consider cases in which (for reasons 
that are interesting but need not concern us here) a "partition" interpretation does 
not seem to appear. Sentence ( 17) is such a case: in a situation as in figure 6 the 
sentence seems false. Although this judgement is subtle, notice the contrast with 
sentence ( 1 8), which in the same situation is clearly true. 
( 1 7) Mary and Sue saw John, Bill and George. 
( 1 8) Mary and Sue gave birth to John, Bill and George. 
John Bill George 
Figure 6: see vs. give birth 
The situation in figure 6 does not contain a maximal number of see ing 
relations, given that it is possible that every woman saw every man. However, i t  i s  
impossible that two or more women gave birth to the same child and therefore figure 
6 contains a maximal number of "giving birth" relations with respect to sentence 
( 1 8) .  Consequently, the SMH expects the contrast between ( 1 7) and ( 1 8) to appear. 
7 SMH interactions 
SMH effects with reciprocals, conjunction and transitive constructions can in teract .  
For example, sentence ( 1 9) involves "weak" interpretations for both the conjunct ion 
and the reciprocal . To see this consider a situation in which John is sitting on George. 
who in tum is standing on Bill .  Sentence ( 1 9) is true in this situation, although there 
is no boy who is both sitting and standing on another boy, and although neither the 
sitting nor the standing relation satisfies strong reciprocity with respect to the boys .  
( 1 9) The boys are sitting and standing on each other. 
The SMH handles such examples correctly. A hyper-graph between couples of 
boys and sitting/standing relations is depicted in figure 7 .  Any additional triple-arc 
connecting two boys and a property would violate properties of to sit on or to stand 
on. Thus, this situation verifies ( 1 9) according to the SMH. In the next section we 
will see how this is worked out formally. 
Sentence (20) is another example for an SMH interaction, this time between 
transitivity and conjunction: the sentence is true in case the NP these [eners refers to 
WHAT DOES THE STRONGEST MEANING HYPOTHESIS MEAN? 
John George 
sit on stand on 
Bill George 
Figure 7 :  standing and sitting on each other 
letters A and B, where letter A was sent by Mary and received by John and letter B 
was sent by John and received by Mary. Sentence (2 1 ) ,  from Sternefeld (to appear) , 
is an example for weakening effects with respect to the reciprocal and the other two 
arguments of the predicate: (2 1 )  is true in the same situation mentioned above for 
(20). As in ( 1 9) ,  the SMH in its extended formulation accounts for these phenomena. 
(20) Mary and John sent and received these letters. 
(2 1 )  Mary and John sent these letters to each other. 
An interesting empirical exercise that I did not manage to solve is to try to find ca�es 
where the three weakening effects interact. 
8 Formalization 
In formalizing the SMH we first define a nonnalfonn for the basic meaning, relative 
to the tuple of n-ary predicates involved. This formula is weakened using world 
knowledge (meaning postulates) about these predicates, i .e. the conditions on the i r  
possible denotations . The underlined notions are defined as  follows. 
Notation: N - the natural numbers. For every s E N, N. d;j {i E N :  i ::; ;; I 
Definition 1 An ( 71/ . n )  predicate tuple is an 71/-tuple (PI , P2 , " "  Pm ) of I I -ary 
predicate constants. 
Definition 2 An (71/ , 71 ) nonnal universalfonn relative to an ( rn , n )  predicate tuplc 
(PI ,  P2 , . . .  , Pm ) is a formula of the form 
Vi E Nm Vl" I E A )  Vl"2 E A2 " VXn E An [1!, ( Pj , X ) , X2 ,  . . . , Xn ) ]  
Definition 3 &p, the ( rn , n )  world knowledge about an (rn ,  n ) predicate tuple P is  
a subset of En X En X . . .  X En , where E is the domain of individuals. , .I 
m 
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Definition 4 The following formula is the SMH weakening of an (m, n) normal 
universal form relative to (m, n) world knowledge 8p: 
'\:I(R) , R2 , . . .  Rm}  E Sp 
I {  ( i , x ) , x2 ,  . . .  , xn ) E Nm x AI x A2 X • • •  X An : t/J(P; , x ) , x2 ,  . . .  , xn ) } 1 � 
I {  ( i , xI , x2 , . . .  , xn ) E Nm X AI X A2 X • • .  X An : t/J (R; , X ) ,  X2 , . . .  , xn ) } I  
To exemplify the operation of these definitions consider again sentence ( 1 9) ,  
which is a rather general case due to the double weakening required in both the 
reciprocal and the conjunction. Strong reciprocity and Boolean conjunction derive 
the following basic meaning for ( 1 9), in a (2, 2) normal universal form: 
(22) '\:li E { 1 , 2}  '\:IXI E hoys' '\:Ix2 E hoys' [XI =f. X2 � P; (X ) , X2 ) ]  
where P = (siLon' , stand_on') .  
The world knowledge Sp should reflect the following lexical facts about the 
meaning of the predicates sit_on' and stand_on' : (i) They are mutually exclusive 
relations: if X is sitting on y then X is not standing on y. (ii) Their union describes 
an acyclic collection of mutually exclusive directed paths. Acyclicity means that if 
XI is sitting/standing on X2. X2 on X3, . . .  , Xn- I  on Xn , then Xn is neither sitting nor 
standing on XI . The mutual exclusion of paths means that a person cannot sit or 
stand on more than one person and that two different persons cannot sit or stand on 
the same person. 
If RI and R2 are two relations, then the fact that they are mutually exclusive 
is simply expressed by RI n R2 = 0. We denote the required properties of the 
relation RI U R2 by acyclic (R I  U R2) and m_ex_path (R I U R2 ) . Acyclicity of a 
relation R means that its transitive closure is anti-symmetric. Fonnally: 
• The transitive closure of a relation R, trans(R) , is a relation recursively 
defined by: 
transo (R) = R 
transi+ 1 (R) = 
trans; (R) U { (x , y) : 3z [(x , z } E transi (R) /\ (z , y) E transi (R) ] } 
trans(R) = U�o trans; (R) 
• A relation R is anti-symmetric iff '\:lx'\:Iy[R (x ,  y) � -.R(y,  x) ] 
• A relation R is acyclic iff trans ( R) is anti-symmetric. 
The requirement about mutual exclusive paths of a relation R is fonnally defined 
by: 
'\:Ix'\:Iy'\:lz[ [ (R(x , y) /\ y =f. z ) � -.R(x , z ) ]  /\ [ (R(x ,  y) /\ X =f. z ) � -.R(z , y) ] ]  
Thus, we define Sp for P = (siLon' , stand_on') : 
{ (R \ , R2 )  E E2 x E2 : R\  n R2 = 0 /\ acyclic (R\  U R2 ) /\ m_ex_path (R \  U R2 ) }  
The fonnula given in (22) above is the nonnal universal fonn of the basic meaning 
of ( 1 9) .  Its SMH weakening is given in (23). 
WHAT DOES THE STRONGEST MEANING HYPOTHESIS MEAN? 
(23) V(R\ , R2) E E>p 
I {  ( i , X ) , X2 )  E { 1 , 2} x boys' X boys' : x\ i- X2 -t P; (x) , x2 ) } 1  � 
I {  ( i , x \ , xz)  E { 1 , 2} x boys' X boys' : x\ i- Xz -t Ri (x ) , xz ) } 1 
In words: for any relations R\ , Rz that are possible denotations of siLon' and 
stand_on' respectively, the total number of pairs of different boys x \ ,  Xz such that 
siLon' (x\ , xz) . plus the total number of pairs of different boys X \ , XZ such that 
stand_on' (x\ , xz) is greater or equal to the similar sum with R\ and Rz . 
Let us observe now that the situation in figure 7 satisfies (23) .  Note first that 
in this situation 
I { ( i , x \ , xz) E { 1 , 2} x boys' x boys' : x\ i- Xz -t Pi (x \ , xz) } 1 = 8 
This is because the following tuples ( i , x \ , xz) in { 1 , 2} x boys' x boys' are the 
ones for which the formula x\ i- Xz -t Pi (X \ , X2) holds: 
( I , j' , j') (2, j' , j') ( I , b' , b') (2, b' , b') ( I , g' , g' ) (2, g' , g') ( I , j' , g' ) (2 , g' ,  b') 
Let us denote: 
s(R) , Rz) = I {  ( i , x \ , xz)  E { 1 , 2} x boys' x boys' : x \ i- X2 -t Ri (x \ , X2 ) } 1  
We want to show: V(R\ , Rz) E E>p [8 � s (R) , Rz) ]  
The proof is by constructing R\ , Rz in E>p with maximal s(R\ , R2) '  Without loss 
of generality. assume R \ (j' ,  g') .  Let us denote R� = Ri n (boys' x boys') .  It is 
not hard to show by enumeration of cases that one of the following conditions must 
hold if R\ and R2 satisfy s(R\ , R2) � 8 and (R\ , Rz) E E>p: 
l .  R� = { (j' , g' ) } ,  Rf = { (g' , b') } 
2. R� = { O' , g' ) , (g' , b' ) } ,  Rf = 0 
3. R� = { (j' , g' ) } ,  Rf = { (b' , j' ) }  
4.  R� = { O' , g' ) , (b' , j') } ,  Rf = 0  
In Other words: given that R\ (j' ,  g' )  holds. in order for R I  and Rz to satisfy 
s (R I ,  R2 ) � 8 without satisfying one of the four conditions above. they must 
violate the condition (R I ' R2) E E>p 
But for the four possibilities above s (R 1 , R2 ) = 8. which means that (23) is true. 
9 Loose ends 
There are some cases in which the strongest meaning hypothesis seems to be too 
strong. Namely. weakening occurs although it is not supposed to according to the 
SMH. Consider the following example from Philip ( 1 996) : 
(24) The boys are tickling each other. 
In the situation of figure 8(a) below (24) is true although the SMH expects it to be 
false: it is possible for every boy to tickle both other boys in the picture. 
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(a) (b) 
John John 
Bill George Bill George 
Figure 8: boys tickling each other 
The reason for this potential counter-example to the SMH might be some 
gap in our world knowledge about predicates like to tickle: although it can happen 
that a boy tickles more than one object, this might not be the default assumption 
about the predicate. In principle, it might be that the lexical knowledge about the 
predicate does require "uniqueness" of an object tickled by a person, and this would 
allow the SMH to account for the interpretation of (24). However, it is completely 
possible for John to tickle both George and Bill at the same time. Therefore, we 
must assume that the "uniqueness" default can be overridden: it is not as robust as 
the lexical knowledge we considered with predicates like to stand on or to give birth 
to. This immediately predicts that whenever the default assumption is overridden 
also the SMH ignores it. For example, in the situation in figure 8(b) every boy is 
tickling also a cat, in addition to the boy he is already tickling in (a). Consequently, 
we expect (24) to be interpreted differently in situation (b) than it is in (a) : the 
sentence is expected to be false in (b) because in this case it is evident that every 
boy is not tickling the maximal number of boys he potentially can. Whether this 
prediction is borne out is not too clear. It seems to me that in such delicate pragmatic 
matters introspection is not enough and careful experimental research is needed. 
There is also an opposite problem. In certain cases the SMH expects weak­
ening to occur although actually it does not. Consider the following examples: 
(25) # Mary and Sue gave birth to each other. (after Sauerland ( 1 994» 
(26) # Mary and Sue gave birth to John. (after Edwin Williams (p .c . »  
In sentence (25) the SMH expects a weakened interpretation: either Mary gave Birth 
to Sue or Sue gave birth to Mary. This is clearly not the case because the oddness 
of the sentence indicates that it is a case of strong reciprocity: the implausible 
claim that Mary gave birth to Sue and vice versa. The same with (26): since it 
is impossible that two women gave birth to the same child the SMH expects (26) 
to have a weak, plausible, interpretation: either Mary or Sue gave birth to John. 
This is incorrect. It seems that although the predicate to give birth can allow some 
weakening effects (cf. ( 1 8» , there is a "lower bound" to the weakening that can take 
WHAT DOES THE STRONGEST MEANING HYPOTHESIS MEAN? 
place: each member of the group argument should take part in at least one "giving 
birth" relation .. Why this is so is an open question. 
10 Conclusion 
The strongest meaning hypothesis makes a non-standard connection between lexical 
semantics and formal semantics.  It implies that the seemingly unsystematic semantic 
behaviour of predication with plurals is a manifestation of an incomplete formal 
semantics: some lexical semantic information is required in order to compute the 
meaning of a plural predicate. In this paper I tried to show that this perspective 
on Dalrymple et al. 's study of reciprocals can reveal systematicity also in other 
cases of plural predication. No less important for the objectives of the present 
enterprise is the possibility it opens to avoid lexical ambiguities or foundational 
complications in the formal semantic apparatus.  Contrary to common opinions, 
the minimalistic and elegant assumptions of Boolean semantics might prove to be 
linguistically enlightening also for the shady domain of plurality. 
Endnotes 
* Thanks to the participants of SALT6 and to the audiences at lectures given in OTS 
and UCLA for helpful comments. Especially, I am grateful to Ed Keenan, Bill 
Philip, VIi Sauerland, Tim Stowell, Anna Szabolcsi and Henk Verkuyl. Thanks to 
Yael Seggev for the drawings. Financial support was provided by the Dutch Orga­
nization for Scientific Research (NWO) and by the Netherlands Graduate School of 
Linguistics (LOT). 
1 .  Uli Sauerland (p.c.) mentions a similar contrast that was independently observed 
by Roger Schwarzschild. 
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